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MARKETING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES FROM AGRICULTURAL LAND: 
STATED PREFERENCES OVER PAYMENT MECHANISMS   
AND ACTUAL SALES OF BIRD HABITAT ON HAYFIELDS 
 
Agriculture conventionally supplies food, fiber and fuel that consumers can purchase through the 
market. With the right incentives, farmers can also provide ecosystem services such as wildlife 
habitat, climate regulation, surface water flows and waste absorption and breakdown. Such 
incentives have so far come almost entirely from government-sponsored programs that rely on 
financial assistance to farmers to encourage them to alter agricultural practices or input mix to 
enhance ecosystem services. Programs recently implemented in Costa Rica and Columbia rely on 
payments by the beneficiaries of the ecosystem services, such as municipal water companies and 
water users (Pagiola, Landell-Mills et al. 2002). Few of these programs, however, have attempted 
to establish a market for ecosystem services in which the beneficiaries of such services pay the 
suppliers their personal values of ecosystem services in an actual market. 
Markets for ecosystem services must overcome two major challenges. In order to set 
prices for ecosystem services at the “right” level, it is imperative to understand consumers’ 
preferences. Farmland, however, has multiple attributes such as wildlife habitat services and 
landscape view; the marginal rate of substitution among those attributes must be understood to 
design marketable products for ecosystem services. Moreover, many ecosystem services are 
public goods for which traditional markets are ill-suited, because many individuals can receive 
benefits simultaneously regardless of whether they have paid part of the cost of provision. 
Therefore, consumers have an incentive to free-ride on others. Evidence from previous research 
on public goods clearly suggests that under-contribution is typical (Ledyard 1995).
1 
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The overall goal of this study is to explore the potential to establish an actual market in 
which the public can purchase ecosystem services generated by agricultural land. Specifically, 
this paper examines the performance of alternative elicitation methods, some of which 
theoretically reduces individuals’ incentives to free-ride on others’ payments. The application 
involves valuation of an ecosystem service, which is a significant area of public policy concern as 
governments and non-profit organizations, both domestic and international, attempt to introduce 
market-based mechanism to enhance the provision of ecosystem services (e.g., USDA2007).   
Using a choice experiment involving a large-scale mail survey, we first estimate the 
marginal rate of substitution consumers place on various attributes of farmland including the 
ecosystem services such land can provide. We then utilize the choice experiment data to compare 
the marginal utility of income and attributes across elicitation mechanisms and examine their 
capability to attract participation and revenue, as well as their capacity to reveal a 
willingness-to-pay that is close to its theoretical true value. We conclude by comparing the results 
from a hypothetical survey to the outcome of our effort to establish an actual market in which 
individuals are asked to purchase a share of a farm contract to provide ecosystem service with 
real money under different payment mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study to examine the performance of different payment mechanisms for provision of ecosystem 
services using field experiments both within a hypothetical setting and by developing an actual 
market.   
 
Elicitation Methods of Payments for Public Goods and Tested Hypotheses 
Many ecosystem services are public goods for which traditional markets are ill-suited, because 
many individuals can receive benefits simultaneously regardless of whether they have paid part Page | 3  
 
of the cost of provision. Therefore, consumers have an incentive to free-ride on others. Evidence 
from previous research on public goods clearly suggests that under-contribution is typical 
(Ledyard 1995). Relying on payment mechanisms that inaccurately reflect contributors’ 
preferences implies that socially desirable public goods are produced at suboptimal levels and 
underscores the need for a market mechanism capable of revealing the true demand for 
ecosystem services. 
Controlled economic experiments have shown that individuals will increase donations to a 
public good project if the payment rules reduce the incentives for individuals to free ride on the 
contributions of others. (Marks and Croson)(1998, c.f.(Rondeau, Schulze et al. 1999; Poe, Clark et 
al. 2002) show that individuals will pay dollars into a project if there is a provision point and 
money back guarantee. Under these conditions, the public good is supplied only if a pre-specified 
amount of money (the provision point) is raised, and contributors receive their money back if the 
market fails to raise that amount. (Spencer, Swallow et al. 1998) successfully applied the provision 
point mechanism to water quality monitoring.  
We extend this literature in several ways. While most of the previous work focused on the 
effect of a combination of a provision point and a money-back guarantee, this mechanism is not 
incentive compatible. In addition to the provision point mechanism, we examine and compare the 
performance of the pivotal mechanism, which is an incentive compatible mechanism. 
Theoretically, the pivotal mechanism can serve as a benchmark of true revelation of preferences. 
We also examine the performance of the uniform price auction, which is not incentive compatible 
but has a ‘fairness’ feature that other mechanisms do not have.   
Furthermore, although most previous studies compared how the mechanism in question 
affects how much individuals contribute to a public good, we examine the underlying reasons of 
why people contribute different amounts. To do so, we utilize a choice experiment and allow 
quantity of the good as well as the cost to the individual to vary. Using the data from the choice Page | 4  
 
experiment, we can econometrically test whether the mechanism affects marginal utility of 
income or it also affects the marginal utility of the particular good. We also examine how market 
participation rate is affected by elicitation methods.   
More specifically, we compare four payment mechanisms applied in field experiments: 
1) voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), 2) provision point with a money-back guarantee 
and proportional rebate of excess contributions (PR), 3) uniform-price, multi-buyer auction 
(UPA) and 4) pivotal mechanism (PM). VCM has no provision point but has a money-back 
guarantee a pre-specified amount of money is not raised. Under PR, the public good is supplied 
only if a pre-specified amount of money (the provision point) is raised, and contributors receive 
their money back if the market fails to raise that amount. Under a multi-buyer auction, everyone 
who is willing to pay above a certain “price” will pay a price such that the total sum will be 
enough to cover the cost for a farmer to change harvest practices. Under a pivotal mechanism 
only those consumers whose payments make a difference in the provision of the good would pay. 
The pivotal mechanism is incentive compatible and is used as the baseline. In this research, a 
provision point relates to the minimum of total offers that are required to implement a contract to 
provide the ecosystem service. 
 
Habitat for Grassland Nesting Birds: An Application 
The ecosystem service in question in this study is habitat for a grassland-nesting bird called the 
Bobolink (Dolichonyx oryivorus). Yellow and black Bobolinks establish ground nests in hay 
fields from mid-May into early June. Their visibility and entertaining character, combined with 
evidence that many birds, including bobolinks, are experiencing population declines (Sauer, 
Hines et al. 2004), make the bird a leading candidate to attract public interest in efforts to manage 
farmland for vulnerable wildlife. Previous studies have established that hay harvesting conducted Page | 5  
 
during the birds’ five to six week nesting period is devastating to fledgling success (e.g., Mitchell, 
Smith et al. 2000). A fairly moderate shift in the harvest schedule could provide significant refuge 
for nesting birds while causing some losses of the quantity and quality of the hay harvested. If a 
market developed that paid farmers acceptable compensation to protect grassland birds, then 
farmers would have an incentive to add an ecosystem service to their revenue base while 
enhancing environmental quality for wildlife. 
Choice experiment 
As a precursor to establishing a market for this ecosystem service generated by hayfields, 
we measure the residents’ preferences by employing a choice experiment (CE). CE is based on 
random utility theory and attempts to understand the individuals’ preferences over the attributes 
of scenarios. The combinations of attributes comprise specific scenarios that are selected from a 
set of possible scenarios. Unlike the contingent valuation method that focuses on a precise 
scenario, CEs ask each individual to choose from alternative scenarios, i.e., bundles of attributes. 
They have been used in marketing, transportation, psychology, and more recently, in the 
environmental economics literature (Adamowicz, Boxall et al. 1998). They are useful as a 
method of eliciting values and preferences for ecosystem services, as a given resource often 
provides multiple ecosystem services. 
CE was designed to elicit preferences relating to changing hayfield management to 
protect grassland birds. Before the CE questions, we first presented information on how hayfields 
in their community provide habitat to Bobolinks and other grassland birds. We described what 
Bobolinks are, reasons why their population is in decline and how residents can help farmers 
make wildlife protection a part of farmers’ business plan. We also explained other benefits of 
hayfields such as its potential role in preventing invasive species. Page | 6  
 
We then presented a hypothetical setting of an opportunity for the respondents to 
purchase a ‘farm-wildlife contract’. The setting was described as follows:   
·  Ecologists have identified farms in Jamestown with Bobolink habitats. 
·  The farmers are willing to enter into farm-wildlife contracts to include wildlife in their 
business plan. Under the contract, the Jamestown residents would pay a farmer to protect 
nesting birds during the breeding season by delaying harvest and restoring inactive fields. 
·  The total contract cost depends on the characteristics of the farm. Different farmers may face 
different costs, even if they provide wildlife and landscape amenities on the same number of 
acres.   
·  The residents in Jamestown are asked to pay for a share of farm-wildlife contracts. 
Respondents were asked to compare several sets of farm-wildlife contracts, each of 
which was characterized by four attributes and its cost (Table 1). ‘Acres of managed hay fields’ 
was presented as one attribute. However, in fact it is a composite attribute with two elements, 
acres and the expected number of bobolink fledglings. These two elements are positively (but not 
perfectly) correlated: the larger the area of managed hay fields, the higher the expected number of 
bobolink fledglings. In designing the CE, the number of bobolink fledglings was treated as an 
independent, two-level attribute. For example, 10 acres of managed hayfields can result in either 
15-25 bobolink fledglings (low) or 30-45 bobolink fledglings (high). The second attribute, acres 
of restored fields, also with four levels, was included because from our discussions with the local 
farmers we saw an opportunity in restoring abandoned fields into actively managed hayfields, 
which would in the long run provide additional habitat for grassland birds. ‘View’ was a 
two-level attribute—a parcel either has a view from a major road or not. ‘Tour’, a two-level 
attribute, is a private good character of a farm-wildlife contract, where the contract either Page | 7  
 
includes an invitation to an expert-led bird walk or not. Finally, ‘cost’ is an eight-level attribute. 
In the fifth of the six questions, the cost became a composite attribute: we gave a 10% or a 20% 
discount for the ‘both’ option. In designing the CE, the level of discount was treated as an 
independent, two-level attribute. We also included a sixth question where only one contract was 
offered; the respondents were asked whether or not he/she would be willing to purchase that 
contract. The attributes, their levels and the methods of describing each one were constructed 
based on information obtained from focus group meetings and through consultation with an avian 
biologist and were tested and refined during pretesting. 
The respondents were asked to compare six pairs of farm-wildlife contracts that differ in 
land size of managed hayfields for bobolink habitat and other characteristics. Each contract was 
characterized by four characteristics and its cost (Table 1). Respondents were asked to make 
decisions on six, independent sets of farm-wildlife contracts. The first five questions had two 
alternative contracts, while the sixth question only included one contract. Individuals were asked 
to choose among ‘do nothing’, two alternative farm-wildlife contracts, or ‘both’ (in the first five 
questions only) and if both, which farm-wildlife contract they still preferred. In the fifth question, 
we gave a 10% or a 20% discount for the ‘both’ option, while fixing the ‘tour’ option to ‘invited 
to a bird walk.’ We also included a sixth question where only one contract was offered; the 
respondents were asked whether or not he/she would be willing to purchase that contract. 
The scenarios were constructed from a 4
2x2
3x8x2 orthogonal main-effects design using 
SAS. In total, we had 256 pairs of farm-wildlife contracts for comparisons and 32 single 
farm-wildlife contract questions. However, to make the choice task manageable for each 
individual, the design was blocked into groups, depending on the question and the treatment.   
 Page | 8  
 
Treatments 
  The residents were randomly divided into two major groups with seven subgroups in 
total, each with a different treatment. The residents were first split into two groups. The first 
group was further divided into four subgroups Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM), 
Proportional Rebate (PR), Uniform Price Auction (UPA) and Pivotal Mechanism (PM). These 
four subgroups were asked to make a decision under a hypothetical referendum for a tax increase 
to implement the contract. They then received four more questions, this time based on one of 
these four mechanisms.   
The second group was further divided into three subgroups. Each group was assigned to 
one of the following three payment mechanism: Proportional Rebate (PR), Uniform Price 
Auction (UPA) and Pivotal Mechanism (PM). Other sections of the survey were identical for all 
the residents. Details of each mechanism are provided in Appendix xx.   
Importantly, the treatments were randomly assigned to the residents and the structure and 
the design of the choice experiments was the same for all treatments. Descriptive statistics of the 
demographic characteristics show that there were no systematic differences among the treatment 
groups (Table 2).   
Survey Design and Implementation 
To develop the survey, the research team first held two focus groups in Massachusetts. 
There were approximately eight people in each focus group. We took the information learned 
from these and developed a draft of our survey. This survey was then pretested at the Division of 
Motor Vehicles in Wakefield, Rhode Island. Those completing this survey were timed to test the 
length of taking the survey and they were asked questions upon completion to find any 
difficulties in taking the survey. The survey was revised based on the feedback received and was Page | 9  
 
pretested again in a similar manner. This process was repeated several more times. Individual’s 
reactions to different mechanisms’ explanations and examples of were carefully studied in each 
case. The final survey was then created based on both the focus groups and the pretesting of 
earlier versions.
2 
The final survey was collected between October to December 2006 following the 
Dillman’s Tailored Design Method (Dillman 2000), in which mailings were done as following: 1) 
initial letter explaining what the survey was about and when it should be coming, 2) initial 
mailing of the survey, 3) a reminder postcard to those that did not respond, 4) a second survey 
and 5) a final reminder letter. Each mailing of the survey included a cover letter and stickers in 
which to seal the completed survey for mailing. We had a total of 224 different versions (32 
blocks x 7 treatments) of the survey, which were randomly assigned to individuals. Special care 
was taken to assure that individuals received the same version of the survey in each mailing. 
The sampling frame used for the survey was all available addresses of Jamestown 
residents purchased through a commercial databank. If there were more than one adult per 
address with the same family address, we selected one individual randomly. At the end, the 
surveys were sent to 2893 households.   
The response rate was 38.2% after accounting for undelivered surveys (Table 3). There 
were no systematic differences in response rates among the four mechanisms. Type 2 surveys had 
a slightly lower response rate compared to Type 1 surveys, but we did not find any systematic 
                                                    
2 The survey was composed of five sections. The first section included questions about their past 
and present community, as well as questions about their opinion on farms and their wildlife. The 
second section included choice questions which asked which farm contract, if any, the survey 
respondents would purchase. In the third section, individuals were asked about their opinions on 
farmland amenities. The fourth section asked individuals about their opinions on wildlife 
conservation efforts. The final section consisted of demographic questions about the respondent 
and their household. Page | 10  
 
differences in demographic variables between type 1 group and the type 2 group. Using 
demographic variables available in the original database, the mean age was slightly higher for the 
respondents compared to non-respondents, but there were no systematic differences in income or 
gender. 
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
The CE structure with different treatments can be analyzed using a random utility model 
(Hanneman 1984; Adamowicz, Boxall et al. 1998). The choice of a scenario represents a discrete 
choice from a set of alternatives. For each alternative i  ( , , , ) i A B neither both Î under treatment m 
( , , , , 1, 2) m VCM PR UPA PM Type Type Î   is represented with an indirect utility function that 
contains a deterministic component  ( ) im V   and a stochastic component  ( ) im e . The overall 
indirect utility of alternative  i  in the k
th occasion under treatment m is represented as 
im im im U V e = + . An individual will choose alternative  i  if  im jm U U >   for all  j i ¹ . Since the 
utilities include a stochastic component, the probability of choosing alternative  i  is described as 
( ) ( ) Pr Pr , , im im jm jm i chosen V V j C j i e e = + > + " Î ¹ , 
where C is the set of all possible alternatives.   
Assuming a type I extreme value distribution for the error terms and independence 

















where  k l   is the scale parameter for treatment m. We employ conditional logit to estimate these 
parameters (later version of the paper will include results from a panel mixed logit model.)   Page | 11  
 
  The general form for the deterministic component is 
( ) ( ) im im m im m im V Y C Z a b g = + - +   (1) 
where  im a   is a vector of alternative specific constants and treatment effects on the base utility of 
the neither and both alternatives; Y represents the respondent’s income; Cim represents the cost of 
alternative i under treatment m; and Zim represents a vector of all other attributes of alternative i 
under treatment m, which include acres of managed hayfields, expected fledglings saved (high or 
low), acres of hayfields restored, farm landscape view and invitation to bird walk in 2007. The 
subscript m is included because even though all the attributes were common across the treatments, 
we capture the treatment effect using interaction terms between each treatment and the attribute. 
m b   and  m g   are parameters capturing the marginal utility of income and the marginal utility of 
all other attributes of a farm-wildlife contract for alternative i under treatment m.   
  We report two versions of the model, one without treatment effects and the other with 
treatment effects. Each version was estimated in linear and quadratic forms, with and without 




                                                    
3 In any single sample, the scale parameter cannot be identified and thus is assumed to be one. In 
separate samples or across separate data types, however, one can compute the relative scale 
parameter, which accounts for the difference in the variation of the unobserved effects or error 
variance heterogeneity. Since each type of treatment should be consistent with random utility 
theory and the choices are being made over the same types of situations, we can also combine the 
data sets and examine the relative scale effects. Combining data adds information for model 
estimation; using Swait and Louviere (1993), we can test whether the differences in the estimates 
across treatments are due to differences in marginal utility of income, marginal utility of 
farm-wildlife contract attributes, or the variance of the unobserved components, or all of them. In 
our application, the data from all treatments are pooled. Normalizing the scale factor for one of the 
treatments set to unity, we can estimate the relative scale parameter along with other parameters in 
the equation. Page | 12  
 
Hypotheses 
Using the above model, we compare the elicitation methods from four aspects: if and how 
elicitation methods affect respondents’ choices and preferences; willingness-to-pay for ecosystem 
services and other attributes market participation rate; and total revenue collection. Here we lay 
out the hypotheses to be tested. 
If there is no treatment effect from different elicitation methods, then all the alternative 
specific constants  m a , as well as all the parameters  m b   and  m g that are interacted with specific 
treatments that capture the effects of the treatments are jointly equal to zero (hypothesis 1).   
Next, we examine the more specific process through which elicitation mechanisms may 
affect preferences. If respondents treat monetary costs differently under certain elicitation 
mechanisms, then we expect each elicitation mechanism to yield different estimates of  m b , the 
marginal utility of income (hypothesis 2). On the other hand, if respondents treat attributes of the 
farm wildlife contracts differently under different elicitation methods, then the estimates of  m g , 
the marginal utility of attributes, will differ (hypothesis 3). Johnston et al. (1999) have shown that 
substitution effects may arise between how the public good is financed and the attributes of the 
good. Therefore, there is a potential that elicitation methods with different incentives to curve 
freeriding may change the marginal utility of an attribute. 
Respondents also may react to the treatment by a fixed effect on their overall utility for a 
given utility. This effect can be represented as a shift in the intercept of the willingness-to-pay 
function (Swallow 1994). In model (1), this effect is identified by the interaction terms between 
each treatment and alternative specific constants, in particular for “neither” alternative 
(hypotheses 4 and 5).   
Respondents may react to different elicitation methods such as PR, UPA and PM Page | 13  
 
differently if they had an experience with an alterative method immediately prior to the method in 
question that can serve as a reference. In our sample, respondents who received Type 1 of the 
survey was asked to make a choice under a hypothetical referendum for a tax to implement 
farm-wildlife contract. We test whether or not this reference mechanism makes a difference in 
treatment effects (hypothesis 6). 
Next, using the estimates for marginal utility of income and of attributes, we estimate 
and compare the willingness-to-pay for each attribute. Since UPA, PR, and PM all have 
incentives to curve freeriding, such as a provision point with a money-back guarantee if not 
enough money is offered, we hypothesize that these three mechanisms reveal higher WTP 
compared to VCM. Moreover, PM is the only incentive compatible mechanism, so we expect PM 
to reveal a higher WTP for attributes. Finally, since respondents under UPA only need to pay the 
smallest offer that is enough to reach the provision point, there might be an incentive to bid a 
smaller offer than their true value. We therefore hypothesize the following: 
VCM<UPA<PR<PM (hypothesis 7). 
On the other hand, UPA has a ‘fairness’ aspect that PR does not have, which may affect the 
market participation rate. We hypothesize the ranking of the mechanisms in terms of participation 
rate as follows: 
VCM<PR<UPA<PM (hypothesis 8). 
 
Results from Choice Experiment 
The conditional logit model results in both the linear and quadratic forms are as expected 
(Table 4).
4  In all four variants of the model, all five non-monetary attributes have positive and 
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significant coefficients. The coefficients on area of managed hayfields and area of restored fields 
get slightly smaller as these areas increase. The coefficient on cost is negative and significant, as 
expected. The quadratic model (columns 3 and 4) outperforms the linear model (columns 1 and 
2) but produces qualitatively similar results.   
The results of the conditional logit model with variables interacted with elicitation 
methods are generally consistent with the model without the interaction terms (Table 5). The base 
category is referendum tax. In all three variants of the model, all five non-monetary attributes 
have positive coefficients. The coefficient on the binary variable indicating high bobolink habitat 
is insignificant in columns (2) and (3). This result may be reflecting the possibility that since this 
variable and acres of managed hayfields were presented as a combined attribute in the CE 
questions, the respondents may not have paid attention to high and low levels of bobolink 
fledglings and instead focused their attention on the area. The coefficients on area of managed 
hayfields and area of restored fields get slightly smaller as these areas increase. The coefficient 
on cost is negative and significant, as expected. 
Comparing the coefficients on the non-monetary attributes between models without 
controlling for elicitation methods (Table 4) and with controlling (Table 5), we find that the 
coefficient on areas of managed hayfields do not change (0.027) but those on other attributes do 
change, suggesting the possibility that elicitation methods may have an effect on marginal utility 
of certain attributes but not on others. The attribute whose coefficient increased the most was 
‘invited to bird walk’, which is the private good attribute. Since the omitted category is 
referendum tax, the results suggest that other mechanisms are pulling the average down. On the 
other hand, the coefficient on view from major road’ decreased, which suggests that other 
elicitation methods are pulling the average up. Indeed, although the estimates are insignificant, Page | 15  
 
the interaction terms between ‘view from a major road’ and PR, UPA and PM are positive, while 
the interaction terms between ‘invited to a bird walk’ and PR, VCM, and PM are negative. 
Although this trend is statistically inconclusive, the substitution effects among non-monetary 
attributes of elicitation methods that give incentives to reduce free-riding requires further 
investigation.   
Results of hypotheses tests 
Table 6 summarizes the likelihood ratio tests of hypotheses related to effects of different 
elicitation methods. The first test on treatment effects is rejected with a high significance level 
(hypothesis 1). The elicitation methods jointly affect the estimated coefficients in the utility 
model. Next we investigate the source of the treatment effects. We reject hypothesis 2 that 
marginal utility of income is unaffected by elicitation methods. In fact, we reject this hypothesis 
for all four elicitation mechanisms when tested individually (2a-2d). (The base category is 
referendum tax). 
To the contrary, we cannot reject the rest of the hypotheses tests. Specifically, the test 
results suggest that the elicitation methods do not jointly affect marginal utility of farm-wildlife 
contracts attributes (hypothesis 3), nor do they shift utility level (hypotheses 4 and 5). Having a 
reference mechanism prior to the elicitation method in question also has no effect on marginal 
utility of income and non-monetary attributes.   
Based on inspection of these hypotheses tests and the relevant coefficients in Table 5 
(column 3), we conclude that the main impact of these elicitation methods come through changes 
in marginal utility of income.   
Given this finding, we next compute the marginal utility of income across elicitation 
methods (Table 7). The coefficients range from -0.035 to -0.028. Surprisingly, the ranking of the Page | 16  
 
mechanisms in this aspect was VCM>PM>PR>UPA. While the ranking of PM, PR and UPA is 
consistent with hypothesis 7, the differences in the estimates are not statistically significant. More 
importantly, respondents with VCM revealing the lowest marginal utility of income. The 
coefficient estimates between VCM and UPA, and VCM and PR were statistically different at the 
10% significance level. One possible reason may be that respondents are used to VCM, which is 
the approach taken by most donations. Other elicitation methods, including PR, UPRA and PM, 
are new to most respondents, and thus may have resulted in a lower marginal utility of income 
(higher absolute value).   
Participation rate 
Among those who responded to the survey, 97 respondents (10%) said they would not purchase 
any contract. In contrast, 78 respondents (8%) said they would purchase one or both contracts for 
all six questions with varying levels of attributes and costs. The rest of the respondents said they 
would purchase one or both contracts in at least one out of the six questions but not all of them.   
  When we break down the participation rate (# of respondents choosing to purchase at 
least one contract / total # of respondents) for each elicitation mechanism, we find that the 
participation rate for VCM, PR, UPA and PM are 93%, 89%, 92% and 88%, respectively. 
Therefore the ranking is VCM>UPA>PR>PM. While our intuition that the participation rate may 
be higher for UPA than PR seems to fit with the data (hypothesis 8), this result again raises a 
question about how people perceived VCM and PM.   
 
Market Experiment 
In spring 2007, we launched the Nature Services Exchange of Jamestown, a marketplace 
for an ecosystem-service, first by establishing actual farm wildlife contracts with farmers and Page | 17  
 
then selling shares of those contracts to consumers. The Exchange was open to the public for five 
weeks from the last week of March through April 30, 2007. The deadline was forced by the 
timing of arrival and breeding of bobolinks in Jamestown, RI. Each farm wildlife contract was 
tied to one or more of the payment mechanisms. Since we set a type of a provision rule for all the 
contracts, whether each contract remains effective during the breeding season depended on the 
market outcome under each mechanism. Residents were assigned to one of the farm-wildlife 
contracts, each of which was tied to one or more elicitation methods. If the resident was present 
in the mailing list for the fall 2006 survey, we assigned the same elicitation method as before. 
Otherwise, new residents were randomly assigned to one of the three methods. 
In the next version of this paper, we will compare the actual consumer behavior across 
alternative methods and also to their willingness to pay as estimated in the survey choice 
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Table 1. Farm-wildlife contract attributes and their levels used in choice experiment questions 
 
Attribute  Description    Levels 
 
A  farmer  will  delay  the  mowing  and 
harvesting on a hayfield of a specified size. 
This  is  expected  to  save  the  specified 
number  of  Bobolink  fledglings  in  2007. 
Different  farms  may  have different expected 
number of fledglings saved, even if they have 
the same number of acres. In reality, we will 
count the number of singing males to estimate 
how many fledglings have survived in 2007. For 
your reference, one acre is  about 75% of a 
football field. 
Acres: 10, 25, 40, 
55 
 
Fledglings:  high 
or  low  (number 
corresponded to 
level of acres) 
 
A farmer will restore an inactive field to 
active  hay  production.  This  would  create 
new habitat for Bobolinks and other wildlife, 
reduce  the  number  of  invasive  species  and 
create more scenic farm views. Mowing and 
harvesting will not be delayed on these 
acres. 
0,  10,  20,  30 
acres 
 
A parcel may or may not be located along a 
major road so that you can view birds from the 
roadside. 
View / No view 
 
Residents who paid some amount towards a 
farm wildlife contract will be invited to a bird 
walk led by expert birders in June 2007. 
Invited  /  Not 
invited 
 
This  is  the  proposed  amount  that  you  are 
asked to pay this year towards a farm wildlife 
contract with this farm.   
$10,  $20,  $35, 




Source: Authors’ survey. Page | 21  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of demographic characteristics, by auction mechanism. 
 









































Number of years 































Source: Authors’ data. 
 
Note:  Based  on  a  series  of  group  mean  comparison  t-tests,  the  means  were  not  statistically 
significantly different at the 5% significance level for all the above variables. The mean income 
level was statistically different at the 10% significance level between VCM and PM groups. The 
proportion  of  households  with  children  under  18  was  statistically  different  at  the  10% 
significance level between UPA and PM groups. Page | 22  
 
Table 3. Summary of treatments and response rate, by survey type and auction mechanism. 
           
    Responses  Mailed 
Response rate* 
(%)   
Total     993  2983  38.2   
  Type 1  701  2024  35*   
  Referendum+VCM  176  505  35*   
  Referendum+PR  179  507  35*   
  Referendum+UPA  174  506  34*   
  Referendum+PM  171  506  34*   
  Type 2  292  959  30*   
  PR  94  319  29*   
  UPA  100  320  31*   
  PM  98  320  31*   
           
By Mechanism            
  VCM  176  505  35*   
  PR  273  826  33*   
  UPA  274  826  33*   
  PM  269  826  33*   
           
Source: Authors’ data. 
 
Notes:  *Raw  response  rates  and  does  not  take  into  account  of  undelivered  mails.  After  accounting  for 
undelivered mails, the overall response rate was 38 percent. Type 1 includes two stated-preference questions 
before presenting four questions under a specific mechanism; Type 2 includes six questions all under the same 
mechanism.  VCM=Voluntary  Contribution  Mechanism;  PR=Proportional  Rebate;  UPA=Uniform  Price 
Auction; PM=Pivotal Mechanism. Page | 23  
 
 
Table 4. Estimation results from conditional logit model estimation. 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
ASC_NO  -1.097  -0.886  -1.084  -0.899 
  (11.84)***  (6.18)***  (9.40)***  (5.23)*** 
ASC_both  0.069  -0.236  0.164  -0.155 
  (0.85)  (1.84)*  (1.95)*  (1.17) 
ASC_NO_income    -0.002    -0.002 
    (2.00)**    (1.45) 
ASC_both_income    0.003    0.003 
    (2.96)***    (3.04)*** 
Area of managed 
hayfields 






































Invited to bird walk  0.079  0.081  0.091  0.093 
  (3.30)***  (3.38)***  (3.74)***  (3.81)*** 
Cost  -0.021  -0.024  -0.032  -0.036 
  (26.24)***  (14.84)***  (19.63)***  (11.27)*** 
Cost x income    0.000    0.000 
    (1.55)    (1.47) 
(Area of managed 
hayfields)
 2 




(Area of restored 
fields)
2 





2      0.000  0.000 
      (7.84)***  (4.79)*** 
cost
2 x income        -0.000 
        (1.05) 
Observations  16480  16480  16480  16480 
Log likelihood  -4926  -4888  -4883  -4846 
Pseudo R2  0.138  0.144  0.145  0.152 
         
Income  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Quadratic    No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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Table 5. Estimation results from conditional logit model estimation with mechanism variables 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
ASC_NO  -1.090  -0.850  -0.932 
  (7.02)***  (4.45)***  (3.87)*** 
ASC_both  -0.090  -0.405  -0.224 
  (0.73)  (2.54)**  (1.19) 
ASC_NO_inc    -0.002  -0.002 
    (2.16)**  (1.78)* 
ASC_both_inc    0.003  0.003 
    (2.96)***  (3.14)*** 
ASC_NO_m_vcm  0.070  0.080  0.163 
  (0.30)  (0.34)  (0.48) 
ASC_NO_m_pppr  -0.107  -0.125  0.073 
  (0.54)  (0.63)  (0.26) 
ASC_NO_m_upa  -0.223  -0.229  0.076 
  (1.11)  (1.14)  (0.27) 
ASC_NO_m_pm  0.065  0.055  -0.018 
  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.06) 
ASC_both_m_vcm  -0.018  0.004  -0.201 
  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.67) 
ASC_both_m_pppr  0.241  0.234  0.116 
  (1.44)  (1.38)  (0.49) 
ASC_both_m_upa  0.270  0.296  0.015 
  (1.58)  (1.73)*  (0.06) 
ASC_both_m_pm  0.229  0.223  0.239 
  (1.34)  (1.29)  (0.99) 








High bobolink habitat  0.075  0.075  0.113 
(highbobo)  (1.96)*  (1.96)*  (1.59) 
Acres of restored fields  0.022  0.023  0.027 
(restore)  (10.51)***  (10.65)***  (4.74)*** 
View from major road  0.110  0.111  0.085 
(view)  (4.66)***  (4.70)***  (2.03)** 
Invited to birdwalk  0.080  0.084  0.133 
(tour)  (3.36)***  (3.49)***  (3.16)*** 
(Acres of managed hayfields)
2      -0.000 
      (4.50)*** 
(Acres of restored fields)
2      -0.000 
      (3.21)*** 
Cost  -0.016  -0.017  -0.029 
  (10.68)***  (7.30)***  (7.75)*** 
Cost x income    0.000  0.000 
    (0.51)  (0.85) 
Cost
2      0.000 
      (4.37)*** Page | 25  
 
Cost
2 x income      -0.000 
      (0.86) 
cost_m_vcm  -0.005  -0.001  -0.000 
  (1.89)*  (0.36)  (0.06) 
cost_m_pppr  -0.008  -0.010  -0.012 
  (3.05)***  (2.71)***  (2.86)*** 
cost_m_ppprA  0.002  -0.001  0.003 
  (0.82)  (0.28)  (0.64) 
cost_m_upa  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011 
  (4.25)***  (3.37)***  (2.74)*** 
cost_m_upaA  0.002  0.002  0.004 
  (1.06)  (0.89)  (0.82) 
cost_m_pm  -0.011  -0.012  -0.011 
  (4.24)***  (3.04)***  (2.54)** 
cost_m_pmA  0.006  0.002  0.003 
  (3.40)***  (0.43)  (0.65) 
costinc_m_vcm    -0.000  -0.000 
    (1.66)*  (1.71)* 
costinc_m_pppr    0.000  0.000 
    (0.83)  (0.64) 
costinc_m_ppprA    0.000  0.000 
    (0.85)  (0.99) 
costinc_m_upa    0.000  -0.000 
    (0.11)  (0.17) 
costinc_m_upaA    0.002  0.000 
    (0.19)  (0.02) 
costinc_m_pm    0.000  0.000 
    (0.33)  (0.13) 
costinc_m_pmA    0.000  0.000 
    (1.17)  (1.21) 
acres_m_vcm      0.000 
      (0.09) 
acres_m_pppr      0.005 
      (0.95) 
acres_m_ppprA      -0.009 
      (1.67)* 
acres_m_upa      0.001 
      (0.12) 
acres_m_upaA      0.002 
      (0.39) 
acres_m_pm      -0.005 
      (1.06) 
acres_m_pmA      0.003 
      (0.61) 
highbobo_m_vcm      -0.116 
      (0.83) 
highbobo_m_pppr      0.017 
      (0.12) 
highbobo_m_ppprA      0.057 
      (0.34) Page | 26  
 
highbobo_m_upa      0.018 
      (0.12) 
highbobo_m_upaA      -0.183 
      (1.09) 
highbobo_m_pm      -0.021 
      (0.15) 
highbobo_m_pmA      -0.118 
      (0.70) 
restore_m_vcm      0.021 
      (2.76)*** 
restore_m_pppr      0.007 
      (0.87) 
restore_m_ppprA      -0.009 
      (1.03) 
restore_m_upa      0.016 
      (1.95)* 
restore_m_upaA      0.001 
      (0.08) 
restore_m_pm      0.014 
      (1.74)* 
restore_m_pmA      -0.003 
      (0.38) 
view_m_vcm      -0.087 
      (1.00) 
view_m_pppr            0.112 
      (1.25) 
view_m_ppprA      0.007 
      (0.06) 
view_m_upa      0.131 
      (1.42) 
view_m_upaA      -0.085 
      (0.78) 
view_m_pm      0.019 
      (0.21) 
view_m_pmA      -0.045 
      (0.42) 
tour_m_vcm      -0.095 
      (1.07) 
tour_m_pppr      -0.026 
      (0.29) 
tour_m_ppprA      0.065 
      (0.62) 
tour_m_upa      0.006 
      (0.06) 
tour_m_upaA      -0.093 
      (0.85) 
tour_m_pm      -0.072 
      (0.81) 
tour_m_pmA      -0.096 
      (0.89) Page | 27  
 
Observations  16480  16480  16480 
Log likelihood  -4896  -4851  -4794 
Pseudo R2  0.143  0.151  0.161 
Income  No  Yes  Yes 
Quadratic  No  No  Yes 
 
 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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Table 6. Likelihood ratio tests of hypotheses regarding responses to elicitation methods. 
Null Hypothesis  Log-likelihood 









1)  Elicitation  method  does  not  affect 
preference  parameters  (All  coefficients 
interacted  with  a  mechanism  are    jointly 
equal to zero) 
-4846  103.37  57  0.0002 
2)  Marginal  utility  of  income  is  the  same 
under all elicitation methods (all coefficients 
on  cost  specific  to  mechanisms  are  jointly 
equal to zero.) 
-4815  41.62  14  0.0001 
2a) Voluntary contribution mechanism  -4797  5.16  2  0.0757 
2b) Proportional Rebate  -4802  15.34  4  0.0040 
2c) Uniform Price Auction  -4803  16.70  4  0.0022 
2d) Pivotal Mechanism  -4802  15.83  4  0.0033 
3) Marginal utility of farm-wildlife contracts 
attributes  is  the  same  across  elicitation 
methods (all coefficients on attributes specific 
to mechanisms are jointly equal to zero.) 
-4814  38.54  35  0.3125 
4) Elicitation methods do not shift utility level 
(Alternative specific constants associated with 
mechanisms are all jointly equal to zero) 
-4796  3.43  8  0.9046 
5)  Elicitation  method  does  not  shift  utility 
level of the no response (No-choice alternative 
specific constants associated with mechanisms 
are all jointly equal to zero) 
-4795  0.37  4  0.9850 
6) A reference mechanism does not affect how 
elicitation  methods affect  marginal utility  of 
income and attributes. 
-4806  30.45  27  0.2942 
 
Notes: Log-likelihood of the unrestricted model is -4794, with 72 parameters. (from Table 3, last 
column).  Log-likelihood  of  the  unrestricted  model  for  the  last  hypothesis  is  -4791  with  78 
parameters. Page | 29  
 
 
Table 7. Comparison of marginal utility of income across elicitation methods. 
 
Mechanism  Coefficient estimate 













Note:  The  estimated  z-statistics  in  parentheses  were  calculated  using  the  delta  method.  The 
absolute  value  of  coefficient  estimate  for  VCM  is  higher  than  UPA  and  PR  at  the  10% 
significance level. Page | 30  
 
 
Table  8.  Comparison  of  willingness-to-pay  estimates  for  each  attribute  across  elicitation 
mechanisms (US Dollars). 
 






































































           
10 acres with 














Note: The estimated z-statistics in parentheses were calculated using the delta method. Bolded 
cells indicate the mechanism with the highest WTP. Model on Table 5, column (3) (without the 
treatment specific ASCs) were used.   
 
* A typical farm-wildlife contract sold in the market this year is 10 acres of managed hayfields, 
with a view and a tour. 